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DIALOGUE AS ASYMMETRICAL INTERSUBJECTIVITY

ABSTRACT

Basing on ideas proposed by Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jürgen Habermas, this paper suggests combining the concept of horizontal (inter-subjective) relationships between people with the idea of the vertical dialogue with the transcendental, the spirit. The logic of ultimate mutuality brings us closer to the idea of dialogue with the transcendental; the Other as the spirit appears as a third party in the intersubjective space of dialogue. Thus intersubjectivity may become a condition of implementing human spirituality.

Keywords: symbolic exchange; asymmetrical relationships; existential dialogue; discourse ethics; intersubjectivity.

INTRODUCTION

Some ideas stemming from various philosophical traditions, among others proposed by Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jürgen Habermas presented below suggest combining the concept of horizontal (inter-subjective) relationship between people with the idea of the vertical dialogue with the transcendental, the spirit. Such an approach allows for acquiring the authentic self in communicating with other people as well and in the dialogue with the Other (the notion of Other is taken over by Žižek from Jacques Lacan’s theory), which becomes a condition of implementing human spirituality.

SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE AND THE LOGIC OF MUTUALITY

Jean Baudrillard argues that the main law of modern consumer society, characteristic of the postindustrial era, is the law of value, according to which all affections, symbolic and objective relations undergo the procedure of abstracting, revealing their common equivalent in utility and in the system of demands.
Things are able to be consumed only as signs. The transformation of the object into the sign leads to a change in human relationships which become no more felt but abstracted and cancelled, being consumed in the sign-thing. Baudrillard writes:

“Which is not to say that objects are mechanically substituted for an absent relation, to fill a void, no: they describe the void, the locus of the relation, in a development which actually is a way of not experiencing (vivre) it, while always referring to the possibility of an experience. [...] The relation is not absorbed in the absolute positivity of objects, it is articulated on objects, as if through so many material points of contact on a chain of signification. In most cases however, this signifying configuration of objects is impoverished, schematic, and bound, where the idea of a relation, unavailable to experience, merely repeats itself over and over again.” (Baudrillard, 1988, 27–28)

Thus all the ambivalence of social relationships is removed by their equivalence. On the contrary, symbolically, the principle of interactivity is not the symmetry of equivalent exchange but the asymmetry of a gift, giving, sacrifice—that is the principle of inequality or ambivalence. The symbolic exchange arises and evolves beyond the law of value because at bottom it has waste, value annihilation, instead of accumulation, and its final purpose is relationship reversibility. It is the waste produced by the symbolic exchange that enables one to leave the boundaries of extended reproduction of exchange and customer value by destroying their abstract expedience. The activity of both elements is embedded in the reversibility of the symbolic exchange which implies mutuality and duality of relationships. According to Baudrillard, the subject can be alienated only when he or she carries a certain abstract substance, unilaterally subordinating everything else. It is indispensable that the subject’s domination over the object is eliminated. The duality of a symbolic act lies in the equality both of the object to the subject and of the subject to the object. In the case of a different, “positive” attitude towards each other (in Baudrillard’s terms, “under the sign of value and equivalence”), the subject and the object are doomed to constantly endeavor to dominate each other. In the symbolic exchange there arises a new strategy of the subject who henceforth does not long to capture the object, but undergoes a counter-motion on its part, and in this process their positions irreversibly disintegrate. For the symbolic is losing, de-valuating and destroying the sign positivity. Baudrillard brings this logic of mutuality to a limit.

This elimination of the sign, value annihilation may become a basis for the intensity of symbolic relationships and, as a consequence, a possibility of direct (not mediated by signs) living through one’s unity of one’s self and existence.

However, according to Baudrillard, all the establishments of modern society, all its social, economic, political, psychological mediators do not give anyone a
chance for a symbolic, lethal challenge, for such an irreversible gift. It is connected with the transition of “producer-capitalist” society to “cybernetic neocapitalism” which is aimed at total control—the transition that is now taking place.

“Far from ‘indeterminate,’ this mutation is the outcome of an entire history where God, Man, Progress and even History have successively passed away to the advantage of the code, where the death of transcendence benefits immanence, which corresponds to a far more advanced phase of the vertiginous manipulation of social relations.” (Baudrillard, 2006, 60)

The censorship of the sign casts away and displaces death, insanity, childhood, sex, perversion, ignorance. This is the “monopoly of the code” which ideology strives to get hold of.

THE IDEA OF THE OTHER AND ITS CONDITIONINGS

In his studies of ideology (according to him, ideology penetrates all spheres of social life) Slavoj Žižek stands by and develops Jacques Lacan’s views on reality and its subjects as if they were split up and “traumatic” in their essence. Following Lacan, Žižek holds that the direct reality of human life is characterized by a certain crack, fracture, “non-recognition.” The fact is that there is a significant distance between the real and its symbolization: the real is excessive in relation to any symbolization; it is a traumatic event, the “hard core” that resists symbolization, that is not subject to dialectics, and that always persistently turns where it belongs. The main peculiarity of a “traumatic” event is that it is followed by a series of structural effects that distort the reality. The real appears to be a certain substance which must be constructed “behindhand,” so that the deformation of the symbolic structure could be explained. Drawing upon this, Žižek describes the real as an antagonism, i.e. as the cause which does not exist by itself, but is manifested in a set of consequences in a symbolic order. He calls this antagonism an “impossible” core, i.e. a limit that is nothing on its own, a core that is constructed retroactively, from the traumatic point as its reason.

In Žižek’s view, we all reside in conditions of the society of a scrupulously concealed trauma. In the Freud-Lacan tradition, followed by Žižek, not only reality, but the subject is prescribed by the trauma. The trauma appears at the core of subjectivization. The subject becomes possible only in the light of his or her non-integrity, inadequacy, disintegration. It is possible only when a certain material remains that resists subjectivization and when there is a persistently self-asserting surplus in which the subject cannot recognize himself or herself. The subject’s paradox (as well the antagonism of the real) lies in the fact that it exists only due to its own radical impossibility: only due to the Other.
Žižek takes over the notion of the Other from Lacan’s theory. Lacan differentiates between the notions of the other and of the Other. The other (beginning with the small letter) is merely the other person in whom our image is reflected: the other as my image projected outside. When it comes to the Other, what is implied is a radical otherness that outmatches a certain imaginable other; something that cannot be fully appropriated by the ego; something with which the ego cannot perfectly identify itself. According to Lacan, the subject not only speaks in the Other but desires only proceeding from the Other: “... man’s desire finds its meaning in the other’s desire ...” (Lacan, 1996, 222). The first object of his or her will consists in being recognized by the Other. In Lacan’s theory, the Other belongs to the law of symbolic order; it is the place where the symbolic space of the speech is constructed. The Other is not only connected with the speech, but is its source. The speech emanates not from the ego, but from the Other, one evidence of which is that human conscience does not control it. That is why Lacan argues that “the subject’s unconscious is the other’s discourse” (Lacan, 1996, 265). Thus the unconscious is not a container for instincts, but a privileged place for the word. The unconscious “makes slips of the tongue.” Moreover, in Lacan’s words it is “structured as the language”: it manifests itself in such figures of speech as displacement and condensation. Thus psychoanalysis does not aim to restore the subject’s connection with the reality, but it aims to teach the subject the understanding of the truth of the unconscious. It speaks, but its discourse, in Lacan’s view, cannot be deciphered, for it is “the discourse of the Other.” It is not the very subject talking, but his or her unconsciousness. In the beginning was the Word, not Action. The law of the person is that of the language as of the denoting to which he or she constantly resorts. The denoting weaves a net around a person since his or her birth. A neurotic symptom is thought of by Lacan as a result of the situation when the denoting is pushing the denoted out of the subject’s conscience.

In Žižek’s view, the fact that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other leads in modern society to shifting responsibilities for one’s utterances on the ground that the Other talks in one, and one is but an instrument of ideology. Paradoxically, the liberal consumer society converges here with the totalitarian regime where the subject adopts the position of the object, that of an instrument of pleasure of the Other (Žižek, 1995).

According to Žižek, the subject is an answer of the real (the object, the traumatic core) to the question of the Other. The subject is constituted by its own disintegration in relation to the object, to the thing that tempts the human. In Žižek’s view, by its voluminous, spellbinding presence the thing (object) disguises not some other positiveness, but its own place, void, lack in the Other. In other words, the subject must realize that an object-oriented desire not so much looks forward to compensating for a certain lack, but rather is an embodiment of this lack. To expose the illusion of ideological discourse is not simply to claim that there is nothing behind it. The subject of ideology, as Žižek believes, must
be capable of seeing precisely that there is nothing behind the illusion: “nothing” that is the subject itself.

In the space of ideological discourse the subject appears to be alienated into the denoting. The real in him is excluded into the symbolical, paradoxically leaving the void as a positive condition of its existence. The person is locked within the boundaries of a vicious circle formed by the will and the law, the will that appears due to law force. The reason is that the law is a form of indirect influence of ideology. As a consequence of this, the law is somewhat absurd: we must obey it not because it is useful and fair, but simply because it is the law. Žižek assumes that this tautology expresses the vicious circle of law force, when the only reason for its power is the act of its enunciation. In modern society the law of infinite production of desire and pleasure becomes predominating.

One condition of leaving the vicious circle of desire-law, according to Žižek, is love. In the state of love the person can overcome his or her disintegration and dividedness because love can fill the void and make him or her integral. Love is not so much aroused by idealizing the other, but rather its activity lies in penetrating the imperfect Other separated from us. The matter is that the content of the Christian love resides in the affection for human imperfection. This fact is, in Žižek’s view, more valuable today than whenever. Such sacrificial love is love-mercy, agape, which Žižek relates to Saint Paul. In his doctrine, the Christian position in its most radical shape implies just a pause in moving around this vicious circle of law and desire. This pause resides in agape of a deed committed unexpectedly to oneself. For the law this deed will mean death, i.e. a symbolic death that will enable to start everything anew.

There is one more idea that is fundamental for the subject in experiencing love—that of agape. If the traditional (pagan) model glorifies the deed which at its core has self-sacrifice for the sake of the most important, a certain Thing, then Saint Paul speaks about the radical gesture that constitutes the person as he or she is—about murdering the dearest in oneself. This gesture is “a self-destructive act [that] could clear the terrain for a new beginning” (Žižek, 2000, 151). Thus the only means to unlock the vicious circle of sin and punishment is readiness for self-elimination.

Thus Žižek turns to the notion of agape, sacrificial love, to show a possibility for the subject to leave the borders of his or her desire and, ultimately, to overcome one’s own traumatic disruptiveness in a lethal temptation by the Thing. It is possible, as love, according to Žižek, commits a double action when the subject overcomes his or her lack by offering himself or herself to the Other as an object which, in its turn, will replenish a lack in the Other.

As Emmanuel Levinas believes, the source of the ethical is established in the existential necessity of the Other for the Ego: through dialogue with the other the person takes the road to himself or herself. The fact is that, strictly speaking, the existence of the person begins with taking responsibility for the Other.
Levinas creates his own concept of responsibility by transforming the relationships between the internal (person’s “self”) and the external (Other) order into the asymmetry of intersubjective relations. It becomes a basic feature of the person to be capable of giving priority to the higher principle, the ideal of sacredness, due to which the person does not lose, but finds himself or herself. His logic of responsibility contains *inter alia* a thesis that one’s true transcending activity demands to see one’s epiphany in addressing a fellow creature.

“It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself [... ] The face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another sense: in discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response—acuteness of the present—engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality.” (Levinas, 1979, 178)

For Levinas, the Other is another person; the idea of Infinity, God, Good shines through him or her. Thus in the dialogical intersubjective space a third party appears that provides a relationship asymmetry. This asymmetry is understood as one’s fundamental capability of moral responsibility and as acquiring a specific quality, i.e. fertility. Fertility frees the person from his or her own factuality and, leading him or her beyond the boundaries of possible, enables the person to become different. The case is that, according to Levinas, despite the fact that the Other is a fellow creature, the intimacy itself does not reside in the person’s degradation to his or her merge with another person. Levinas believes that with the mutuality that is characteristic of civilized relationships, the asymmetry of intersubjective connection gets forgotten. That is why this civilized mutuality is a space where every person perceives the other as an end, and never as a means to an end. Asymmetrical intersubjectivity becomes a place of transcendence where the subject while maintaining its subject’s structure, receives an opportunity to avoid the fatal retrieval to him or herself and to become different through responsibility for the other. The process of personal transcendence to the Other is itself described by Levinas as kindness that germinates as pluralism. Pluralism is implemented in kindness by passing from one man to another, where the latter may appear only in proximity of a direct contact, or “face to face” communication. “Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face presents itself to my welcome.” (Levinas, 2000, 216)

Levinas contrasts the new notion of human spirit, whose essence manifests itself in the dialogue with the Other, with the classical tradition of integrity and self-sufficiency of the Ego. Meeting the other, according to Levinas, is a fun-
damental element of the spirit. The Other is established as a necessary condition of self-consciousness: the spirit is born on the border between consciousnesses, in dialogue. In the existential necessity of the Other for the Ego Levinas establishes a source of the ethical: through the dialogue with the other a person takes the road to himself or herself.

In this respect the traditional opposition of the subject and the object in the process of cognition becomes limited. The “subject–object” paradigm stays indifferent to the unique experience of internal personal suffering. In dialogical intersubjectivity (as well as in the “asymmetrical intersubjectivity” of spiritual communication) is realized the existential concept of consciousness that goes beyond the frame of subject-object paradigm. Due to this consciousness, a holistic comprehension of the other in his or her unique and original way of existence becomes possible. The consciousness is thought of as something inseparable from the reality of life.

IDENTITY AND PERSONALITY

Together with the change of ideas concerning personality, the meaningful content of identity also changes. In classical philosophy identity is the sameness of a personality to itself as to something whole. In the postmodern discourse a “split” individual may acquire an identity only by identifying himself or herself with someone or something single, deriving from discerning in oneself a multiplicity of variants of one’s own social and existential self-expression. Identity (Latin *identificare*—to identify, Late Latin *identifico*—I identify) is an interrelationship between the person and himself or herself in the coherency and continuity of his or her own volatility. The notion of identity can also be presented as difference in one’s singularity, individuality, and personhood. Personality implies identity as a way of including others (horizontally) and the Other (vertically) in oneself. It seems to me that it is the process of self-identifying that gives the person an opportunity of self-projection, self-integration, and reflection in the framework of communication. Communication includes experiencing, understanding and transcending, namely, the correlation of the person with absolute values. But in the situation of modernity identity constantly evades from being grasped, and does not want to be “discovered,” “unclothed,” “unveiled.” It is not “hidden” but it “hides” from itself and from others. It turns out that the notion of personality gets back to its original etymology, to the Latin *persona*, mask, role, “disguise.” It is conditioned by all the previous history of becoming a person: a self-developing creative personality, who comprehends his or her selfness through believing in God (the medieval person), gives way to the autonomous (self-ruling) subject of modern philosophy. In the 20th century a separate subject gives way to “a man of masses”—a polar opposition of the “personality.” Then an acute problem arises: the man is left without any personality at all. What can be done? Different philosophers
propose various ways to solve it. For instance, Romano Guardini argues that in mass consumer society one must retain one’s person. The notion of person points at “singularity and uniqueness that derive not from particular predisposition or favorable circumstances, but from the fact that this person is called by God.” If a person is called by God then it means that he or she is irreplaceable in his or her responsibility in front of Him. This is the essence of singularity and uniqueness of the person. What matters is that each human has an opportunity to be a person. However, the self-actualization of a spiritual person does not take place only in the shape of individualism. In other words, one confirms one’s individuality not when one sets a goal to develop one’s abilities (it is not an end in itself), but when one makes efforts for the good of society, in order to realize the sense of life. Besides, according to Guardini, establishing the singularity of human personality allows for true friendship that maintains values of good and just in modern times. Guardini’s “person” is not “disguise;” it includes three significant features: opposing God, inherent dignity and indispensability in one’s responsibility. In such a situation, according to Guardini, a personality must cultivate a grave desire of truth, courage that is “opposed to the looming chaos” and ascesis (Guardini, 1998, 93). Suchlike virtues start the mechanism of moral conscience which appears precisely due to certain self-understanding of personalities. The fact is that by retaining the “person” one realizes one’s appurtenance to the moral community, and morality becomes a condition of realizing the universal dialogical space.

AN INTERSUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION

Any true dialogue implies free, self-dependent participants who are capable of bearing responsibility for decision making. In this respect one should pay special attention to the discourse ethics formulated by Jürgen Habermas.

Habermas’ theory of communicative action and that of discourse ethics are based upon an intersubjective approach. The aim of the theory of communicative action is to clarify the premises of rationality in the process of achieving understanding. In this respect Habermas adds to the intersubjective approach the notion of communicative rationality which

“… recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it brings along with it the connotations of a noncoercively unifying, consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome their at first subjectively biased views in favor of a rationally motivated agreement.” (Habermas, 1998, 315)

Communicative action is based on such symbolic acts with help of which the subject can understand and control other people’s actions. On the one hand, communicative action is aimed at informing, on the other—at negotiating: a verbal message reaches its goal if is accepted by other members of a linguistic
community. In communicative action it is not content, but rather form that matters—form, due to which the agreement is being reached.

Habermas writes: “I call interactions communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the intersubjective recognition of validity claims.” (Habermas, 1992, 58). Herewith the participants of communication start claiming on verity, correctness or truthfulness when they refer to the status quo in the objective world, to the social norm, or to their own sense of justice, respectively. Communicative justice is provided where the following conditions of the discourse process are satisfied: 1) none of those who desires to contribute to the discussion can be excluded from the number of its participants; 2) everybody is granted equal opportunities to contribute his or her thoughts; 3) the participants’ thoughts should not diverge from their words; 4) communication must be free from external or internal coercion that positions of acceptance or denial with regard to criticized significance claims were motivated solely by the power of persuasion of better reasons. Herewith it is stressed that true (rational) consensus is achieved through discourse—dialogue as an equal argumentative procedure. Thus formed discourse ethics is universal, i.e., it comprehends every sensible communicative subject. However, as Habermas puts it, the principle of universalization is not sufficient for moral norms to be shaped as absolutely compulsory offers. Universal norms may become global rules for action if they receive recognition on the part of all persons affected by them. The experience of communication norms recognition is related to the fact that the universal approval is achieved if these norms cognitively embody the interest that is common for every involved person. According to discourse ethics, “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (Habermas, 1992, 66). Thus moral issues cannot be tackled monologically but require collective efforts. According to Habermas, universalism requires a cooperative effort.

“By entering into a process of moral argumentation, the participants continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude with the aim of restoring a consensus that has been disrupted. Moral argumentation thus serves to settle conflicts of action by consensual means. […] the revision of the values used to interpret needs and wants cannot be a matter for individuals to handle monologically.” (Habermas, 1992, 67–68)

Thus involving the other means here that community boundaries open up for every person. Finally, in every community the moral community is embedded as its better Ego. Everyone who has been socialized in a communicative form of life belongs to this community. According to Habermas, persons are socialized only on the track of socialization, so morally both a single person, irreplaceable by another, and a member of community are taken into account, and by virtue of
this justice gets related to solidarity. Equality in relations is practiced among the unequal who, nevertheless, realize their solidarity. Discourse ethics justifies the content of morality of treating everyone equally and of solidary responsibility for everyone.

The notion of lifeworld is of constitutive significance for the processes of mutual understanding. In Habermas’ theory, lifeworld functions as forming the context and as being the resource of communicative action. Due to lifeworld as a communication background, its participants

“no longer appear as originators who master situations with the help of accountable actions, but as the products of the traditions in which they stand, of the solidary groups to which they belong, and of the socialization processes within which they grow up.” (Habermas, 1998, 299)

Ultimately, as Habermas claims, in the process of communication lifeworld reproduces itself, namely continues cultural traditions, unites social groups by working out norms of social behavior, and includes representatives of the younger generation into social relations. Thus communicative action serves both to consolidating traditions and to renovating cultural potential, as well as to social interaction and forming solidarity. In the aspect of socialization it contributes to personality formation and identity acquisition.

However, according to Habermas, the tendency of modern social development constitutes a fundamental problem. The fact is that at the bottom of social modernization lifeworld rationalization lies. Progressively rationalized lifeworld is simultaneously separated and subordinated to such formally organized spheres of action as economy and state governing. The formally organized spheres of action are no longer integrated with the help of the mechanism of mutual understanding, but are separated from lifeworld contexts and become a sphere that is free from sociality norms. The isolated systemic social integration lies in coordinating actions through “muted” communication media—money and power. As a result—Habermas argues—the expanding of the mechanisms of systemic integration leads to “colonizing” lifeworld: by penetrating it, on the track of its monetization and bureaucratization, the mechanisms coerce communicative action to fit in formally organized action systems that are regulated through economic exchange and power (Habermas, 1995). However, such social self-regulation means as money and power do not work in spheres of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization; they cannot replace the process of mutual understanding between people.

Habermas assumes that the primary source of suchlike contradictions of social modernization is a fundamental peculiarity of rationality of the Enlightenment project which undergoes severe criticism on his part and becomes a starting point of his own original version of “modern project.” The fact is that the autonomous subject of the Enlightenment in his or her cognition and action splits the world into the subject and the object; this disjunction becomes the
foundation of the European mentality. Habermas’ communicative action theory and discourse ethics oppose the subject-centered reason of the Enlightenment:

“Subject-centered reason finds its criteria in standards of truth and success that govern the relationships of knowing and purposively acting subjects to the world of possible objects or states of affairs.” (Habermas, 1998, 314)

Habermas confronts the institutional and cultural coercion that distorts communication and imposes false agreement:

“Subject-centered reason is the product of division and usurpation, indeed of a social process in the course of which a subordinated moment assumes the place of the whole, without having the power to assimilate the structure of the whole.” (Habermas, 1998, 315)

In this respect the thinker considers it indispensable to re-orient social development towards the fundamentally subject-subjective structure, the interaction that is constituted in interpersonal communication. Instrumental rationality is oriented towards achieving goals, which inevitably implies the pragmatic use of the other as the object (means), whereas communicative rationality implies accepting the other as a means to an end, and excludes every goal except the act of self-realization itself. In this respect the emancipation interest of a person who is longing to liberation from any violence may be realized only through the establishing of true “interaction.” Communicative reason expresses the intersubjectivity of relations that are aimed at mutual understanding, and relations based on mutual recognition. The structure of intersubjective relations allows the subject to reject the objectivized position and to work out an absolutely different attitude to him or herself. Drawing on this, Habermas argues that the paradigm of object cognition and operation must give a way to the paradigm of mutual understanding between the subjects who are capable of reason and action. Thus, there is a truly humanistic potential of modern project embedded in creating communicative reason and in the theory of communicative action. Habermas believes that the instrumental reason, separated from moral values, indeed no longer continues to serve the person and even opposes him or her, as moral conscience can be formed only in contiguity with the absolutes of human existence, where knowledge and telic rational practices are helpless. This critique of instrumental reason leads Habermas to an updated version of “modern project.” Eager to tie together reason, morality and democracy, he seeks a place for them to meet and finds it in communicative actions meant for achieving agreement, mutual understanding and recognition during negotiations, for exchange of opinions and their grounding. Besides, communicative action serves to consolidating traditions and renovating cultural potential as well as to forming solidarity. Herewith, the “incomplete modern project” is a possibility to create a society that is not hedged off from its own creative abilities that be-
long to the past, but, in contrast, such a society that is in a mobile unity with the past.

The idea of connection between the present and the past in the modern project turns into conscious and obligatory settings with regard to the past and the tradition. According to Habermas, traditions are not something naturally grown up; they wait for being checked, joined and selectively continued. In the society lead by communicative reason, the sense of moral and political autonomy is growing, when people themselves must make decisions regarding the norms of their collective life in the light of arbitrary principles. Under the pressure of mobile (due to communicative actions) traditions and independently elaborated norms, there is formed the principle-regulated moral conscience which changes the socialization pattern.

In *The Inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory* (2002) Habermas argues that the true (rational) consensus is achieved by means of discourse or dialogue. As it was mentioned above, discourse ethics is universal. However, according to Habermas, the principle of universalism is not sufficient for moral norms to be shaped as absolutely compulsory propositions. The universal norms may become global rules of action if they receive recognition on the part of all people to which they relate. The experience of recognizing communicative norms is related to the fact that universal approval is achieved in case these norms cognitively embody the interest that is common for every affected person. Thus moral issues cannot be tackled monologically, but demand collective efforts. It is significant that in terms of Habermas’ universalism is “highly sensitive to differences.” He assumes that equal respect for everyone expands not only on someone like yourself, but on the other in his or her otherness. Thus such a community will be constituted on the basis of the idea of avoiding discrimination and suffering. The involvement of other means here that the community boundaries are open for every person. At last, the moral community is founded in every specific community as its better Ego. Everyone who has been socialized in any communicative form of life belongs to this community. As Habermas puts it, persons are socialized only on the track of socialization, so morally a single person, who is irreplaceable by another, and a common member of community are both to be taken into consideration, and due to this, justice links to solidarity. Equality in deals is practiced among the unequal who, nevertheless, realize their solidarity. Discourse ethics justifies the content of morality that resides in treating everyone equally and in solidary responsibility for everyone.

**CONCLUSIONS**

From the above-presented ideas concerning—less or more directly—dialogue the following conclusions can be drawn. All the examined ideas voices in various philosophical conditionings the thesis that the existence of the person
is constituted by the other, i.e. another for me becomes in a sense a warrant of my Ego.

On the one hand, the norms of discourse ethics enable the dialogue in the sphere of proper interpersonal relations; Habermas’ project of including the other is based on the art of compromise and on the politics of negotiations. On the other hand, the logic of ultimate mutuality and asymmetry of gift in Baudrillard’s symbolic exchange leads us to the idea of dialogue with the transcendent: the third party appears in the space of intersubjective dialogue (the Other as a spirit) which provides a relationship asymmetry. This is proved by the mechanism of love as dedication and self-sacrifice for the sake of the other (sacrificial love-agape by Žižek), as well as by Guardini’s singularity of person as the integrity of dignity and personal indispensability in responsibility in the face of God, and, undoubtedly, by Levinas’ ideal of the sacred due to which the person does not lose, but finds himself or herself. Thus, intersubjectivity (both as a link “human-human” and as the asymmetry of relations Ego-Spirit”) may become a condition of actualizing human spirituality. In its turn, dialogue appears as a possible form of the transcendental in the person and for the person. The personal environment must become a world which emanates from the person toward another person, where personality manifests itself being not closed in its isolated, purely individual Ego. Besides, it is probable that the notion of intersubjectivity put forward in the research presented in this paper can become one of the possible ways of overcoming the cultural dehumanization and may be a sui generis indicator of the transition of the modern society from the postmodern (with its critique of the subject) to the after-postmodern, where the demand for human individuality arises again.

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